Trust and Fear in Civil Wars

Zusatztext

<span><span>Why do some civil wars last a long time, while others end relatively quickly?</span><span>Trust and Fear in Civil Wars</span><span>examines the conditions under which individuals are willing to lay down their weapons under a settlement agreement. The author argues that wars are easiest to resolve when combatants believe that their adversaries will uphold a deal or that the costs of renewed war will be low. Several key sources of information inform this calculation. Drawing on both cross-national and case study data, including detailed interviews, the book demonstrates that when information suggests either that a peace agreement is likely to break down or</span><span></span><span>that the results of a broken deal will be especially deadly, a settlement leaves combatants too vulnerable to countenance, resulting in wars lasting longer.</span></span>

Autorenportrait

<span><span>Shanna Kirschner</span><span>is assistant professor of political science at Allegheny College.</span></span><br><span></span>

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